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Abstract Do retailers exert market power in the fresh fruit and vegetables markets? In the EU countries, as the retail 
industry distributes a significant part of fruit and vegetables, a non competitive behavior might have significant 
impact on consumption, on surplus and welfare. In this paper, we shed some light on the degree of non-competitive 
distortions in the French fresh fruit and vegetable markets. We analyze the market of tomato. The analysis is based on 
aggregate data on final consumption and prices at both shipper and consumer levels in France. The structural model is 
composed of a system of demand equations, supply equations and pricing equations which include terms that capture 
the oligopoly and oligopsony power of the retail sector and that account for product differentiation. We show that: i) 
elasticity of demand varies during the year ii) the exercise of market power decreases over time iii) if markets were 
competitive, retail price would decrease by about 2% to 12% depending on the year while shipping price might be 
10% to 54% higher than observed. As a general result quantities consumed would not change significantly. We 
conclude that the retail sector exerts a moderate market power.  
 
Keywords: Oligopsony, oligopoly, retail industry, fruit and vegetable markets.  
1. Introduction 
    Do retailers exert market power in the fresh fruit and vegetables markets? In EU countries, as the retail 
industry distributes a significant proportion of fruit and vegetables, non-competitive behavior might have 
a significant impact on consumption, surplus and welfare. It may also have an impact on the success of 
public campaigns across European countries promoting fruit and vegetable consumption as for example 
the "5 a day" campaign. In this paper, we shed some light on the degree of non-competitive distortions in 
the French fresh tomato market. 
    There is some evidence of distortions due to non-competitive behavior in retailing in the EU. Thus, in a 
recent investigation, the UK competition commission concluded that they have `concerns in two principal 
areas … several groceries have strong positions in a number of local markets, … and that the transfer of 
excessive risk and unexpected costs by grocery retailers to their suppliers if unchecked will have an 
adverse  effect  on  investment  and  innovation  in  the  supply  chain  and  ultimately  on  consumers'  (UK 
Competition  Commission  (2008)).  Barros  et  al.  (2006)  showed  a  positive  correlation  between  retail 
concentration at the local level and consumer prices. They also found that the most important clients 
obtain  lower  prices,  suggesting  the  exercise  of  buyer  power  vis  à  vis  the  suppliers.  Smith  (2004), 
analyzing the UK market, also showed a positive link between consumer prices and retailer concentration 
at the local level. Biscourp et al. (2008) also found such a link in the case of France. In addition, they 
demonstrated that in France the enforcement of a specific regulation (the ban of below-invoice retail 
prices) has weakened competition among retailers. Moreover, the retail sector is often blamed for taking 
advantage of increasing prices to enlarge its margins on the consumer side.  
. 
    Compared to processed food, fresh fruit and vegetables have some particularities that can make the 
exertion of market power easier, especially on the supply side. Firstly, the fact that they are not processed 3 
means that producers deal directly with retailers. Given that agricultural production in Europe is usually 
undertaken  by  small  or  low-concentrated  farmers,  the  bargaining  power  of  these  farmers  in  any 
negotiation with the highly concentrated retail sector is likely to be negligible. Secondly, fresh produce 
prices are highly seasonal and volatile, depending on weather conditions. Retailers are usually accused of 
using their market power to lower producer prices excessively under bad demand conditions. Conversely, 
under favorable demand conditions, they are accused of increasing prices excessively. Recent studies do 
not support this view of asymmetric price transmission. For instance, a report by London Economics 
(2004) shows that, in the European Union, most studies point to symmetric price transmission in fruit and 
vegetables. Hassan and Simioni (2004) addressed this question for the case of tomatoes and chicory in 
France  and  found  that  asymmetric  price  transmission  is  as  frequent  as  the  symmetric  case.  When 
transmission is asymmetric, they did not find evidence for the widespread assertion that shipping price 
increases  are  completely  and  rapidly  passed  on  to  consumer  prices  while  there  is  a  slower  and  less 
complete transmission of shipping price declines. They found the opposite, i.e., that price declines are 
more rapidly transmitted to consumers than price increases. Moreover, the UK Competition Commission 
(2008) found that `the analysis on fruit supply chain does not support the hypothesis that grocery retailers 
in the UK have engaged in demand withholding in the fruit industry'. 
    Depending on the degree of perishability of products, different models of price formation have been 
developed and estimated using firm-level data. For products that are highly perishable, Sexton et al. 
(2005) focused on price formation at the upstream level. They designed a model where producers and 
retailers bargain to share the surplus from selling the product. They estimated that producers were able to 
keep about 20% of the surplus to be shared. For products that are storable, Richards and Patterson (2003, 
2005) developed and estimated a model allowing for both buyer power and seller power for various fruit 
and vegetable in the US. The model allows testing if retail price fixity is used as a mechanism permitting 
tacit collusion among retailers. They found evidence of seller power and in some cases of buyer power by 
retailers. They also found some evidence that market power decreases with quantities that are sold. 
    To the best of our knowledge, there are no studies on the estimation of retailer market power for fruit 
and vegetables in the European Union. This paper attempts to fill this gap and to provide insights on 
retailer market power for the fresh tomato industry in France. In the paper, we use aggregate data on the 
fresh tomato market and we build on the framework developed by Appelbaum (1982) and Schroeter 
(1988),  which  is  suitable  for  this  kind  of  data.  As  in  Wann  and  Sexton  (1992),  our  model  deals 
simultaneously with oligopoly and oligopsony power while a significant part of this literature only deals 
with oligopoly (e.g., Schroeter (1988), Bettendorf and Verboven (2000)) or imposes equality of oligopoly 
and oligopsony conjectures (e.g., Schroeter and Azzam (1990), and Gohin and Guyomard (2000)). Our 
modeling allows for seasonality changes of elasticities of supply and demand, an important feature for 
fresh products which, at least on the demand size, exhibit significant changes over the year. We also take 
into account product differentiation as we deal with the two main varieties of tomatoes that are relatively 
close substitutes. We find evidence of a moderate exercise of market power by the retail sector. Our 
results suggest that distortions are larger on the producer side than on the consumer side and that they 
tend to decrease over time. 
    The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we briefly present the French fresh tomato industry. In 
Section 3, we detail the model used. We then develop the empirical strategy in Section 4, and we provide 
some information on the data used in Section 5. Results are presented and discussed in Section 6. We 
conclude in Section 7.  
2. The French fresh tomato industry 
    The tomato is the main vegetable consumed in France. In 2004, households purchased 841,000 tons of 
fresh tomatoes for consumption at home (14 kg/per capita). In 2004, the French production of fresh 
tomatoes amounted to 624,000 T.  while  imports  were about 435,000 tons (and exports amounted to 
95,000 tons). From November to February, the supply comes mainly from imports while from March to 
October it comes mainly from national production. 
    Even if tomato production is one of the most organized among the fruit and vegetable industry, the 
production is not concentrated as the 4 main organizations of producers sell only 36% of the whole 
production (Giraud (2006)). The Hirschmann-Herfindahl Index (HHI) of concentration at the production 
level is about 400, which is typical of non-concentrated production. On the contrary, the retail sector is 4 
much more concentrated. In 2004, the market share of retailing chains was 79%, 14% for open markets, 
5% for specialized shops and the remaining 2% for direct sales and others. The HHI of the retail industry 
is about 2000 with a CR4 ranging from 65 to 70%. 
    There  are  different  varieties  of  tomatoes.  The  main  varieties  are  `ronde'  tomatoes  and  `grappe' 
tomatoes, which represented more than 80% of the market in 2005 (Linéaires (2006)). The remaining 
types are `allongée' tomatoes (about 4% of the market), `cerise' tomatoes (about 5% of the market) and 
other varieties (about 7% of the market). 
    We focus on the two main varieties, the `ronde' tomato and the `grappe' tomato. Table 1 shows some 
descriptive statistics for prices and quantities of both varieties. It should be noted that the shipping price is 
about 50 to 60% of the retail price. The retail `margins' (calculated as the difference between the retail 
price and the shipping price) are quite similar for the two products and amount to 0.9 to 0.95€/kg on 
average. On average, the expenditure for tomatoes is about 8% of the total expenditures for fruits and 
vegetables.  As  it  is  well  known,  consumption  of  tomatoes  strongly  varies  during  the  year  with  low 
consumption in winter and high consumption in summer. Over the period 2000-2006, the `grappe' tomato 
increased its market share, even if during winter (when imports are large) its market share is smaller 
     
Table 1: Summary statistics. Weekly data. Prices expressed in €/kg, quantities in Tons 
  ‘Ronde’ Tomato   ‘Grappe’ Tomato  
  Average  Std dev  Min  Max  Average  Std dev  Min  Max 
Shipping price  0.84  0.31  0.27  2.03  1.26  0.43  0.42  2.61 
Retail price  1.74  0.32  1.13  2.96  2.21  0.44  1.18  3.69 
Quantity  3,433  1,340  1,112  7,797  2,316  1,424  431  6,212 
     
As illustrated by the example of `grappe' tomatoes in Figure 1, there is a strong correlation between the 
consumer price and the shipping price. The `margin' calculated as the difference between the two prices 
does not exhibit a trend. There are large and frequent variations around an average (Figure 2). While 
prices follow a general pattern throughout the year with lower prices in summer, margins do not exhibit 
such a trend. On the contrary, we find `high' margins and `low' margins during the whole year. The time 
series of margins seems to be `mean reverting'. These patterns also hold for the `ronde' variety. 
 
 
Figure1: Shipping and retail prices of ‘Grappe’ tomatoes from 2000 to 2006 (€/kg) 
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Figure 2: Retail margin of ‘Grappe’ tomatoes from 2000 to 2006 (€/kg) 
     
    On the production side, most domestic production is from greenhouses. The production process can be 
described as follows: tomatoes are planted from December to February (depending on the region and on 
the planning of the producer). Then, after 8 to 10 weeks, production starts. A given plant will produce 5 to 
6 tomatoes every week during the productive season, which lasts about 10 months after planting. The rate 
of production depends on solar radiation which is not controlled (it is too costly to light the greenhouses 
to favor early production and it is difficult to regulate too hot conditions in summer). All others inputs 
such as water, minerals, fertilizers or pesticides are controlled. Therefore, during the year, there is almost 
no  way  to  adjust  the  production  to  strategically  react  to  changes  in  the  economic  environment.  For 
example,  delaying  the  harvest  of  a  given  week  with  the  expectation  of  receiving  higher  prices  the 
following week (in response to low demand) will have negative consequences on future production of the 
plants. As a consequence, producers do not follow such strategies. The only possibility to adapt to bad 
economic conditions in the short run is to store tomatoes for some period (less than a week) after harvest. 
Thus in the very short run, due to the technology, production is almost insensitive to prices. 
3. The Model 
We develop a model inspired by Appelbaum (1982) and Schroeter (1988) for the French fresh tomato 
industry.  In  particular,  we  consider  a  vertical  chain  with  a  large  number  of  producers  offering  two 
varieties of tomatoes which are bought by retailers who then resell to final consumers. Our setting is close 
to Schroeter and Azzam (1990) or Wann and Sexton (1992). 
    Consumer demand is written as follows: 
           (1) 
where j and k index product varieties (‘ronde’ and ‘grappe’), such that the demand for j at time t depends 
on its own price, the price of the other variety, income (yt) and other shifters affecting demand (Z1t). t is a 
time index. 
Supply is given by: 
        (2) 
where rjt represents the price perceived by producers or shipping price, wt represents the price of other 
inputs, and Z2t other supply shifters. We assume that the price of the other variety in a given period t is not 
affecting the supply of j that period. This assumption is motivated by the fact that producers cannot 
switch to other variety in the immediate or short run, as explained above. 
    Based on the description of the retailing technology, we assume a transformation rate of raw material 
into final product equal to 1. We also assume linear pricing between producers and retailers. The problem 
of the retailer i is to choose   and   to maximize: 6 
    (3) 
subject to the demand and supply equations above.   is the total output of the industry,   is 
the output of product j by firm i, P(.) is the inverse demand function of each product, R(.) is the inverse 
supply function, and C(.) is firm’s i non-material input cost depending on quantity and other inputs’ 
prices. 
The first order conditions from this optimization problem are: 
    (4) 
    (5) 
where   , is the non-material input marginal cost,   (j, k = 1,2) is the elasticity of 
demand,    is  the  elasticity  of  raw  material  input  supply  and    is  the  firm’s 
conjectural variation elasticity. It represents the anticipation that firm i forms with respect to the reaction 
of other firms to a variation of its own level of production. We allow conjectures to be different upstream 
and  dowstream.  Following  Schroeter  and  Azzam  (1990),  the    can  give  a  measure  of  the  non-
competitive distortions in a market, although one should be careful in making inferences about the extent 
of market power, as pointed out by Corts (1999). As noted in Schroeter and Azzam (1990)   and   
should be between 0 and 1, such that in a perfectly competitive market there is no distortion at all, 
because no firm expects to be able to affect total output when choosing its own quantity, while   
would correspond to the case of a monopoly. The values and signs of the cross conjectural parameters, 
 and   are not restricted in general. For example, they could be negative if products were substitutes. 
In summary, the first-order conditions just tell us that for each product the marginal revenue is equal to 
the marginal cost of the material input plus the marginal cost of non-material inputs needed to provide the 
good. Under perfect competition, the price would equal the price of the raw product plus the marginal 
non-material input cost. 
    This  analysis  has  been  developed  at  the  firm  level.  However,  using  aggregate  data  requires  some 
assumptions to guarantee that there is an industry counterpart to the first-order equations given above. 
Basically, what is needed (see Schroeter and Azzam (1990)) is constant and equal marginal costs of 
production  across  firms  plus  non-jointness  of  production.  In  our  context,  this  means  that  retailing 
marginal costs are identical and that retailing of variety 2 does not affect the marginal cost of retailing of 
variety 1, and vice versa. More explicitly: . Nevertheless, an aggregate counterpart 
for the first-order conditions is not guaranteed to exist, so they must be written in terms of industry 
average  values.  The  interpretation  of  the  θ′s  is  now  that  they  are  quantity-weighted  averages  of  the 
corresponding individual θ′s. Therefore, the industry averaged first-order conditions can be written as: 
    (6) 
    (7) 
From these equations we define, as in Schroeter and Azzam (1990), the following measures of market 
power: 
    (8) 
    (9) 7 
      (10) 
L measures the degree of distortion on the consumer side, M measures the distortion on the producers’ 
side and D is an aggreage measure of market power (note that we provide the distorsion for product 1, the 
same applies to product 2). In general, we will have higher distortions the smaller the elasticities and /or 
the larger the  . 
In order to illustrate the importance of these distortions, other comparisons of interest can be made with 
respect  to  the  estimated  competitive  price.  Perfect  competition  in  retailing  implies  . 
Provided we have estimates of supply and demand equations, one can impose competition and then solve 
for the market clearing price. This procedure provides a comparative static estimate of the competitive 
price, i.e., the price that clears the market if we do not allow for any distortion and we keep other things 
equal.With    we can also compute the competitive quantity and the distortions between actual and 
competitive prices and quantities. 
4. Empirical Strategy 
4.1. Demand specification 
As in Wann and Sexton (1992), Bettendorf and Verboven (2000), or Richards and Patterson (2005), we 
consider a linear demand function 
          (11) 
pjt represents the real price of variety j and pkt the price of variety k. Mm is a dummy for month m such 
that the own-price elasticity of demand is allowed to vary throughout the year. yt is consumer income in 
real terms. As we do not have that data, we take as a proxy the total expenditure in fruits and vegetables. 
Tm  is  the  average  temperature.  The  consumption  of  tomatoes  shows  a  positive  autocorrelation  and 
therefore one-period lagged quantities are introduced to control for the autocorrelation of the series. That 
is also why we do not introduce a constant term. The cross-lagged quantity is introduced because it is 
reasonable to think that present consumption of tomatoes will be correlated with total past consumption, 
and not only with consumption of one variety. Therefore, covariates will explain the variation between 
previous  and  current  consumption  and  hence  elasticities  should  be  understood  as  short-run  price 
elasticities. 
4.2. Supply specification 
The supply of tomatoes is modeled as a linear function: 
            (12) 
rjt is the material input price j interacted with a monthly dummy. Sun_NOt is a measure of the total solar 
radiation during week t in a representative producer area in France. As explained before, sunlight is one 
of the most important determinants of tomato production. Qjt-52 is introduced as a proxy for productive 
capacity in week t because of this dependence of production on seasonal climatic conditions and also 
because the planted area does not vary much during the sample period. Therefore, this variable would be 
playing the role of a weekly constant term. 
4.3. Pricing equation specification 
    We  analyze  the  cost  of  the  retail  activity.  The  technology  is  rather  simple  as  the  product  is  not 
processed. It is essentially transported, displayed in the shop and sold. The elements of cost are thus 
mainly the wholesale price of the product, and other cost shifters that in this specification are summarized 
by the price index of transportation costs (TrCost) in real terms. Labor costs follow a pattern similar to 
transportation costs, suggesting collinearity between them. Moreover, when both variables are used to 8 
estimate the pricing equation, the wage index is always non-significant. Therefore, we are not using it to 
model the cost side. 
    Inputs are assumed to be used in fixed proportions, meaning that there is no substitution between inputs 
and that the technology is linear. Therefore, we can write the following empirical counterpart of the first-
order conditions, which are estimated in implicit form: 
        (13) 
        (14) 
 
The variability in supply and own and cross demand elasticities allows the identification of all behavioral 
parameters.  These  elasticities  are  simultaneously  estimated  in  the  demand  and  supply  equations. 
Therefore, the only exogenous variable in these pricing equations is the transportation cost index. 
4.4. Supply specification 
We  add  idiosyncratic  error  terms  and  estimate  the  system  of  six  simultaneous  equations  using  the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) proposed in Hansen (1982). TM, TrCost, and Sun_NO are 
treated as exogenous variables and used as instruments for all equations in the system. Qjt-52 and Qkt-52 are 
considered to be predetermined and therefore added to the set of instruments as well. Considering that 
there is only evidence of an AR(1) in quantities, Qt-52 should not be correlated with the error term at time 
t. The set of instruments is completed with rainfall intensity and an energy price index, both interacted 
with month dummies. These instruments are used to control for the endogeneity of retail and material 
input prices, quantities, and total fruit and vegetables expenditures. 
5. Data 
    Our sample runs from 2000 to 2006 and we use different data sources. From the ‘Service des Nouvelles 
des Marchés du Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche’ (SNM-MAP), we obtained weekly data on 
shipping prices for the two varieties of tomatoes. From a consumer panel (TNS-Worldpanel), we obtained 
weekly data on the quantities purchased and the price paid by consumers (for each of these two varieties) 
as well as the weekly expenditures for fresh fruits and vegetables, used as a proxy for household income.    
Meteorological data are from INRA and ‘Météorologie Nationale’ and consist of daily information about 
the weather in Ile de France (for the demand side) and in the northwest and southeast (for the supply 
side). It is easy to transform these daily data into weekly data: the amount of rain during a week is 
obviously the sum of the daily amount of rain over the week while the temperature is the average. Finally, 
we obtained monthly data from the French Statistical Institute INSEE. This monthly data correspond to 
the fruit and vegetable price index (used as a deflator), and to the transport cost index. The labor cost 
index is quarterly. We transform these  monthly (or quarterly) data into  weekly data  assuming linear 
change within the period. In the end, we have 365 observations (7∗52+1). 
6. Results 
    For both products, we find very significant coefficients with the expected signs (see Table A1 in the 
appendix, which reports the estimated value of the parameters as well as the associated t-statistics). With 
respect to the demand side of the model, all estimated price elasticities are of the right signs and are 
significantly different from 0. Figure 3 plots the average, maximum, and minimum demand elasticities for 
the `grappe' variety by month. Demand is clearly more elastic in autumn and winter than in summer, 
following a U-shaped pattern consistent with the seasonal variation in consumers' taste for fresh products. 
The same pattern holds for the `ronde' variety, although in this case the elasticities are much lower. Cross-
price elasticities are positive and significantly different from 0, indicating the substitutability between the 
two varieties of tomatoes. On average, the cross-price elasticity for `ronde' tomatoes is 0.4 and it is 0.7 for 
`grappe' tomatoes. The expenditure elasticity for `ronde' tomatoes is positive while it is negative for the 
`grappe' variety, but both are highly non-significant. This might be due to substitutions among fruit and 9 
vegetables  when  expenditures  increase,  meaning  that  consumers  diversify  their  purchases.  Finally, 
temperature acts as a significant demand shifter. 
 
   Figure 3: Monthly average of retail-price elasticity of demand for ‘grappe’ tomato (absolute value)  
        With respect to the supply side, all estimated elasticities also have the right sign and are significantly 
different from 0. From Figure 7, we can see that the supply elasticity of the `grappe' variety has some 
seasonality but it is less pronounced than in the demand side (the pattern for `ronde' is similar). Supply 
seems to be slightly more elastic in the months when there is no national production at all (December and 
January), suggesting that the elasticity of imports could be larger because import dealers can divert their 
supplies to other countries if prices are too low. Nevertheless, supply elasticity is in general quite small, 
which is consistent with the fact that producers cannot store the product and therefore, in the end, they are 
forced to sell regardless of prices being low or high. 
     
 
Figure 4: Monthly average of shipping-price elasticity of supply for ‘grappe’ tomato 
        Regarding the exercise of market power, all the estimated conjectural elasticities are positive and 
significantly different from 0 for `ronde' tomatoes. It is not the case for `grappe' tomatoes, as only cross-
conjectural  coefficients  are  significantly  different  from  0  (not  shown).  To  have  an  estimate  of  the 
distortion created by the exercise of market power, we computed the D, L and M indexes defined above 
(Table 2). The exercise of market power is higher in the case of `grappe' tomatoes than in the case of 
`ronde' tomatoes. According to the results, the distortions created upstream and downstream are of a 
similar order of magnitude. 10 
Table 2: Average distortion due to the exercise of market power (%) 
  ‘Ronde’ Tomato  ‘Grappe’ Tomato 
  2001  2006  2001  2006 
Upstream (M)  5.06  -0.78  19.35  6.22 
Downstream (L)  6.61  0.71  18.47  1.71 
Total (D)  16.45  0.26  67.35  11.98 
      
As elasticities vary within the year, the distortions also vary. Figure 5 shows the evolution of the D index 
for the `grappe' variety over the whole sample period. It seems that the distortions were higher at the 
beginning of the period than at the end of the period. 
     
Figure 5: Total distortion due to market power, ‘grappe’ tomato. 
Using  supply  and  demand  functions,  we  do  a  comparative  static  exercise  where  we  compute  a 
counterfactual situation assuming perfect competition of the retail sector (both vis à vis the upstream 
sector and the downstream sector). In 2001, the competitive retail price would be 4.98% lower than the 
non-competitive one for `ronde' tomatoes (Table 3). The shipping price would be 21.12% higher than the 
non-competitive one. In 2006, the differences between competitive prices and non-competitive prices are 
much smaller. 
    Table 3: Average difference between observed and competitive prices (% of observed price) 
  ‘Ronde’ Tomato  ‘Grappe’ Tomato 
  2001  2006  2001  2006 
Retail price  -4.98  -0.28  -12.13  -2.14 
Shipping price  21.12  1.06  54.54  9.89 
         
    We find higher distortions in the case of `grappe' tomatoes. We also find that the price distortions  were 
higher in 2001 than in 2006. Consumers' gains under a perfectly competitive framework, at least in 2006, 
would be small, meaning that distortions on the demand side are negligible. However, producers would 
be better off as they would perceive around a 10% higher shipping price for `grappe' tomatoes, although 
just 1% higher in the case of `ronde' tomatoes. Nevertheless, the distortions were much more important in 
2001, with distortions of up to 54% in the shipping price of the `grappe' variety. Figures 6 and 7 illustrate 
the pattern of observed and counterfactual competitive prices and the decline in distortions from 2001 to 
2006 for the `grappe' variety. 11 
 
Figure 6: Evolution of retail prices for ‘grappe’ tomatoes in 2001 and 2006 
 
Figure 7: Evolution of shipping prices for ‘grappe’ tomatoes in 2001 and 2006 
 
Table 4 shows the distortions in quantities from the counterfactual exercise in 2001 and 2006. For the 
`ronde' variety, they are negligible, but for the `grappe' tomato, we find an almost 10% distortion in 
consumption in 2001 that seems to be corrected at the end of the sample period. In the recent period, 
distortions due to market power have small impact on final consumption.  
Table 4: Average difference between observed and competitive quantities (% of observed quantities) 
   2001  2006 
‘Ronde’ Tomato  1.25  0.08 
‘Grappe’ Tomato  9.36  1.24 
 
7. Conclusion 
    In this paper, we propose a structural model of retailer behavior in the fresh tomato industry and we use 
it to estimate the average market power in the retailing activity. According to our results, the retail sector 
exerts some market power vis à vis the consumers. However, the exercise of this market power remains 
moderate. For example, in absence of market power, we estimate that this would induce a consumer's 
price  decrease  for  the  `grappe'  variety  from  2  to  12%  depending  on  the  year,  and  an  even  smaller 
reduction for the `ronde' variety. This would lead to a marginal increase in the consumption of tomatoes. 
While the retail sector is concentrated, these results suggest that, for this product, the competition among 
retailers is effective. A possible explanation may be that consumers select their retail shop according to 
the prices of a small number of products, among them the tomato. Then price competition among retailers 
is rather `tough' as a low price for this product is a tool to attract consumers. 
    It is mainly producers of tomatoes who suffer from the market power of the retail industry. In absence 
of market power, the shipping price might be 1 to 21% higher than the observed one for `ronde' tomatoes 
and 10 to 54% higher for `grappe' tomatoes. Given the inelasticity of supply this has no significant impact 12 
on quantities. It is mainly a transfer from producers to retailers. In the long run this might have some 
consequences as it could lower the profitability of production and therefore it could also discourage the 
entry of new producers. 
    Finally, according to our results, the exercise of market power was larger in 2001 than in 2006. 
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